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Abstract: 
Corporate governance and bankruptcy in emerging market economies should be 
understood in a broader framework of corporate finance in institutionally weaker 
environments. In this conceptual paper we provide the outlines of such a framework 
and identify key trade-offs that can help structure the policy debate. As debt financing 
from banks is the major source of finance for companies in these economies and 
bankruptcy is the crucial mechanism for protecting investor rights, corporate governance 
and 
bankruptcy reforms are intimately linked. The priorities for these reforms depend 
critically on the specific institutional context. Consequently, they may differ across 
countries. In particular, the policy recommendations for emerging market economies are 
substantially different from those in OECD countries; there is no “one-size-fits-all” 
solution. Recognizing the need for diverse policy solutions that fit the cultural, political, 
and economic environment of each particular country, our paper focuses on the core 
economic principles and mechanisms of corporate governance and bankruptcy in 
emerging market economies and how they can help us understand the costs and benefits of 
various policy options. 
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Introduction 
Corporate governance and bankruptcy are central to the policy discussion in emerging 
market economies (EMEs). In principle, all major corporate governance and bankruptcy 
issues and solutions in developed economies are pertinent for EMEs. However, many core 
debates in the United States and other developed countries mainly deal with public 
corporations with dispersed ownership, and thus are of less immediate concern to EMEs. 
For example, issues relating to independent directors and the functioning of boards, 
executive compensation, hostile takeovers, or shareholder activism, which pervade the 
financial pages of the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times, are not burning issues 
for most EMEs. Similarly, debates relating to whether debtors should be allowed to remain 
in possession of the firm after having declared bankruptcy, or whether there should be 
stricter limits on courts’ authority to grant new priority financing, as interesting and 
pertinent as they are for mature market economies, may not be the priorities of bankruptcy 
reform for EMEs. Unfortunately but understandably, most of the existing academic 
literature on corporate governance and bankruptcy deals with such issues.   
In contrast, the key corporate governance and bankruptcy issues in EMEs have to 
do with bank-financed, privately held small- and medium-size firms and with the role of 
the state in managing the largest corporations. The main corporate governance and 
bankruptcy concern in EMEs has to do more with credit rationing caused by poor 
enforceability of debt contracts and asymmetric information than with selfdealing by 
managers of publicly traded corporations. Banks and the state play a more dominant 
economic role in EMEs and the issues that are of concern for large, widely held 
corporations in developed economies mainly show up at the level of bank governance and 
state intervention. EMEs also face a relatively higher shortage of capital, and governance 
issues are mainly concerned with the problem of lowering the cost of capital and fostering 
business investment. 
In this paper, we sketch a framework for the analysis of corporate governance and 
bankruptcy in EMEs and identify trade-offs that can help inform the policy debate. 
Despite important cross-country differences, lack of enforcement and market failures 
compounded by government failures are overriding concerns for corporate governance and 
bankruptcy, implying that these institutions should be analyzed within the same 
framework. 
 
Corporate Governance, Bankruptcy, and Economic Development 
 
Many if not most emerging market economies are currently enjoying extraordinarily easy 
access to financial capital. In our view, this situation is in large part a reflection of the 
extended period of high growth in developed markets. A global downturn is likely to 
change investors’ willingness to absorb emerging market risk. Previous experiences, most 
recently the Asian and Russian crises in the late 1990s, suggest that it is in these situations 
that a country’s institutions are truly tested.  
We shall take as our starting point the common observation that a typical emerging 
market country has an abundant supply of cheap labor but lacks physical and human 
capital. The main economic reason why per capita income is low in most developing 
countries (by the standard of somewhat simplistic neoclassical economic reasoning) is that 
hourly productivity of the average worker is low. And, hourly productivity is low because 
physical and human capital are both low. In addition, the technology of production and 
basic infrastructure in place in most EMEs normally lag significantly behind the more 
advanced industrial economies. 
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This reasoning has led many economists to the conclusion that the transition out of 
underdevelopment can be accelerated by easing the flow of capital from capital-rich 
countries, where the marginal return on capital is relatively low, to the capital-deprived 
EMEs. However, it is remarkable that, even as global financial markets have become 
increasingly integrated, the capital per worker differentials between high-income and low-
income countries remain large. Indeed, as Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) and others have 
documented, countries that are not members of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) have so far benefited very little from financial 
integration, with the striking exception of China and other South-East Asian Tigers before 
the 1997 crisis. Why are capital flows between high-income and low-income countries are 
so low? Why aren’t capitalists grabbing what appear to be free arbitrage gains by moving 
their investments from high-income to low-income countries?1 
There are many important obstacles to the flow of capital to EMEs—such as the 
lack of transport infrastructure, cultural and linguistic barriers, and low education and 
human capital in the host country—but what appears to be generally true is that 
differences in capital concentration across countries are larger than regional differences 
within countries. Thus country-specific institutional obstacles—the way countries are run; 
their political and legal systems—are likely to be among the most significant factors 
hindering the flow of capital to its highest value use.2 Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) 
estimate a so-called country’s capital wedge (an implicit or explicit country “tax” on 
capital income). They find that the capital wedge is higher in low-income countries and 
lower in middle-income countries, including, in particular, the fast-growing economies of 
China, India, and South-East Asia. What drives the cross-country difference in the capital 
wedge? Of course, capital may not flow to developing countries because economic returns 
are low—for example, human capital is weak or infrastructure is poor—or because 
macroeconomic risks are high. However, capital flows may also be low because private 
returns to new investment in physical and human capital in emerging market economies 
are low. Three kinds of factors influence these returns. First, investors must be better 
protected from expropriation (they must have incentives to provide capital). Second, firms 
must be efficiently governed (capital provided by investors must be allocated correctly). 
Third, human capital matched with physical assets must be efficiently used (hence 
individuals must have incentives to accumulate human capital and not take it out of the 
country). These three factors constitute the problem of corporate governance, broadly 
defined both as protection of investors (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) and as protection of 
quasi-rents generated by firm-specific investments (Zingales 1998). Indeed, capital income 
suffers both from the outright expropriation in favor of insiders and other stakeholders and 
from the waste due to inefficient governance, suboptimal incentives, and internal 
misallocations. Moreover, the two sides of corporate governance are often interrelated: 
expropriation of outside investors may be costly for internal efficiency, as discussed in 
Jensen (2005) and Friebel and Guriev (2005). Effective corporate governance can also 
improve allocation of risks and reduce transactions costs of bargaining over rents 
                                                 
1 Eaton and Kortum (2001) show that most of the world’s capital is produced in a small number of research 
and development–intensive countries, while the rest of the world generally imports its equipment. In his 
influential paper, “Why Doesn’t Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?” Robert Lucas (1990) 
emphasizes the role of human capital and private incentives to accumulate human capital as a quantitatively 
important answer. His other explanations include expropriation and monopoly rents. 
2 See also the survey by Durnev and others (2004) on the relative importance of country-specific versus 
firm-specific determinants of capital allocation in these countries. 
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(Zingales 1998). Both are very important in emerging market economies, where insurance 
markets are not developed, legal adjudication is costly, macroeconomic imbalances are 
large, and political risks are high. As a result, the risk premium in EMEs is higher for 
investments in both physical capital and human skills. Macroeconomic instability and 
weak institutions are interdependent. Improvements in the protection of outside investors, 
governance inside firms, and incentives to accumulate human capital are likely to 
contribute to more stable economic and political conditions. At the same time, a more 
stable macroeconomic environment is in itself an important determinant of investment 
decisions. 
 
The Role of the State in Emerging Markets 
The role of the state in EMEs is complex. The often-lower quality of EME governments 
and more widespread corruption can result in a higher cost of government 
intervention. Far too often government failures reinforce rather than makes up for 
market failures (see Stulz 2005, who argues that the “twin agency” problem of 
investor expropriation by both insiders and government may fatally undermine 
investment). When faced with basic government shortcomings, it is tempting to 
conclude that the path to reform inevitably requires the disengagement of the state 
from economic management and control. Indeed, a central tenet of development 
advice of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other development 
agencies has been to encourage privatization around the world as a way of 
scaling back the role of ineffective and corrupt governments. 
As shown in Megginson (2005), in the majority of instances (for which data are 
available) privatizations have also been liberating and led to faster development and 
growth both at the firm level and at the level of economy. But there have also been 
situations where privatization has achieved little and may have been counterproductive 
(see, for example, Brown, Earle, and Telegdy 2006). One important concern with 
unbridled privatizations, for example, is that they may replace an admittedly dysfunctional 
institution (a corrupt and inefficient state owner) with an institutional 
vacuum. Moreover, the process of privatization itself may be corrupt and may simply 
magnify an underlying government corruption problem and result in illegitimacy of 
property rights. 
In addition, as there are many more market failures in EMEs, there is a greater 
scope for the government intervention. In the face of these potential problems, 
privatization is not necessarily the best way to resolve the initial governance problem 
of a dysfunctional and corrupt state, at least in the absence of complementary 
institutional reforms. If politically feasible, a more complex and more painstaking 
gradual improvement of the workings of government may ultimately be a more 
successful and sustainable approach to development. If the allocation of investment 
funds and government procurement is corrupt and inefficient, then perhaps the 
direct reform of procurement processes and closer oversight of the management of 
state assets may be a more fruitful reform than the radical and ultimately illusory 
disengagement of the state from economic affairs through mass privatization. Without 
a critical mass of private owners, however, it is not clear whether a deep reform 
of the government can either be called for or effectively monitored by the society 
(Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny 1995). 
Finally, there is a potential role for the state as a facilitator and catalyst of institutional 
change, but when it cannot disengage from the ownership and management 
of individual firms it easily gets bogged down by the sheer resources required. Moreover, 
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conflicts of interests arising from the involvement in individual firms may 
undermine the development impact of any effort to resolve coordination problems. 
 
Our Approach 
Not only are there different reasons for the low private returns to capital in many 
emerging market economies, but different solutions may also be needed. Even in 
mature market economies, there is no first best solution to the problems of corporate 
governance and bankruptcy. In reality, there is considerable variation in legal 
rules and institutions across countries and over time. Optimal corporate governance 
and bankruptcy institutions are necessarily second best solutions to multiple collective 
action and moral hazard problems. Since the nature and extent of the collective 
action and moral hazard problems are likely to vary considerably across firms and 
countries, the same corporate governance institutions cannot be appropriate for all 
firms and countries. There is no “one-size-fits-all” solution. 
Recognizing the need for diverse policy solutions that fit the cultural, political, 
and economic environment of each particular country, our paper focuses more on 
the common economic principles and mechanisms of corporate governance and 
bankruptcy across EMEs and attempts to identify the costs and benefits of various 
policy options. It is useful to acknowledge that not only do different environments 
call for different policy responses (see Skeel 2004), but also that the enforcement of 
the same law or policy may be very different in different countries (Berkowitz, Pistor, 
and Richard 2003). 
 
Key Trade-Offs in Corporate Governance in EMEs 
 
Corporate governance is the end result of a complex interaction between a number of 
mechanisms constraining management of a firm, allowing it to commit to certain 
corporate strategies and future payouts of profits. Large blockholdings of equity is 
probably the most direct such mechanism. Holders of such blocks need to find ways 
to commit themselves toward management and investors with minority stakes: for 
example, by listing on exchanges offering a strong regulatory framework and potentially 
opening themselves to takeovers. Governance by commercial banks may also 
facilitate commitment for managers and controlling owners. However, concentration 
of ownership reduces liquidity of equity markets and reduces the power of market for 
corporate control and the board of directors as corporate governance mechanisms. 
In reforming corporate governance policymakers face a number of important 
tradeoffs and dilemmas. 
 
Developing a Broad Stock Market or Encouraging Delisting? 
Stock market development involves protection of minority shareholders, which may 
reduce mobility in the market for corporate control and slow down ownership 
consolidation. On the contrary, policies promoting delisting—such as squeeze outs, 
freeze outs, and breakthrough rules—encourage more efficient takeovers but undermine 
broad share ownership (Berglof and Burkart 2003). Insofar as the benefits of 
concentrated ownership outweigh its costs, mobility in the control market is preferable. 
This trade-off is especially salient in Central and Eastern Europe, where after 
very different reform paths, ownership has become increasingly concentrated and 
stock markets remain shallow (Berglof and Bolton 2002; Berglof and Pajuste 2003). 
However, investors’ willingness to take large control blocks is undermined when 
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controlling owners are made too easy to replace: for example, through rules restricting 
their ability to exercise their control when faced with a takeover threat, such as 
in the so-called “break-through” rule discussed in the context of the European Union 
takeover directive. 
Where possible, the trade-off between stock market development and effective 
governance by controlling shareholders is best resolved at the firm level rather than at 
the country level. The policies should aim at lowering the costs of self-selection into listed 
and nonlisted companies. The limited enforcement capacity should then be focused on 
the public companies, strengthening the commitment value of going public. 
 
Transparency versus Business Secrecy 
Enforcing disclosure is one of the major tools for reducing costs of outside financing 
(LaPorta, Lopoez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2006). Yet disclosure may constrain 
managerial initiative and increase the risks of expropriation by the government. 
This is why the optimal disclosure depends on firm-level characteristics such as 
investment 
opportunities, ownership structure (Ostberg 2005), and the political risk, which 
can also be firm-specific (Goriaev and Sonin 2005). Hence mandatory disclosure rules 
may be socially suboptimal. 
In addition, too much transparency can be costly for businesses whose comparative 
advantages are more efficient business processes or production technologies. For 
example, firms in the United States approach special financial intermediaries such as 
venture capitalists, whose reputational concerns prevent them from abusing access to 
information. Yet the venture capital market does rely substantially on a developed 
legal system (Kaplan, Martel, and Stromberg 2004) and may not function well in most 
emerging market economies. 
In designing and enforcing transparency requirements, focus should again be 
given to those aspects of information that truly enhance the commitment ability of 
firms. Disclosure of the governance arrangements themselves, in particular a firm’s 
ownership and control structure, should be a basic element in any transparency 
policy. At the same time, it is important not to overburden small firms with demands 
of information. Encouraging the development of information intermediaries is a 
viable alternative. 
 
Courts versus Regulators 
Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer (2001) argue that aggressive regulation of securities 
markets may outperform reliance on courts in transition economies. They explicitly 
model the incentives of judges and regulators and show that in some cases the 
politically motivated regulators may be better suited for environments with weak 
institutions. In particular, they argue that strong regulation helped the Polish stock 
market overtake the Czech one in the 1990s. Yet their analysis implies that the 
optimal solution would be very different for different emerging market economies. 
Later evidence suggests, however, that regulatory enforcement, at least of transparency 
requirements, is lower and deteriorating in Poland, where as the Czech 
Republic has gone through a remarkable improvement in recent years (Berglof and 
Pajuste 2003). 
China represents a very special case where all listed companies are governmentowned 
and both judges and regulators are government-controlled. Thus one would 
expect both courts and regulators to exhibit a pro-government bias. Yet China has 
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managed to provide political incentives through yardstick competition. As the 
central government has set regional listing quotas, the securities regulator, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, has engaged the support of provincial governments 
to select and regulate listed companies (Du and Xu 2005). Such a federalismbased 
incentive structure is not costless, however. Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2005) 
show that capital mobility across Chinese provinces is actually surprisingly low. 
We are not convinced that there is a simple choice between courts and regulatory 
intervention. Most of the time, the two mechanisms complement each other. It is not 
obvious that one of the mechanisms is more sensitive than the other to broader 
institutional environment. The Chinese example suggests that they are both susceptible 
to external influence, particularly by the government. Again, China offers an 
example of how the government can improve its ability to commit not to intervene 
by delegating decisions. 
 
Corporate Law and Regulation versus Corporate Chapters and Codes 
As argued above, corporate governance in EMEs may be voluntarily improved by 
individual firms (Durnev and Kim 2005). Yet even as uniform regulation is too blunt 
and indiscriminate, decentralized charters impose a substantial burden on courts 
(Burkart and Panunzi 2006). The intermediate solutions are codes that are more 
flexible, allowing companies to sort according to their preferences and needs for 
stricter or softer corporate governance rules. 
 
Shareholders vs. Stakeholders 
The policies above discuss the trade-offs with regard to maximizing shareholder 
value. However, the firm’s objective function may also include payoffs to stakeholders 
including labor, national and regional government, suppliers, and customers (we 
discuss creditors separately in the bankruptcy section). In EMEs, a stakeholder 
perspective may be particularly important when considering policy responses. First, 
in virtually all EMEs, stakeholders play an important role in running firms. Second, 
stakeholders’ intervention may be socially optimal. Indeed, if redistribution through 
government is rather costly (for example, if taxes, the pension system, and public 
education do not function properly), corporations may be a more efficient channel 
for solving social issues. Also, if labor and product markets are segmented, corporate 
decisions impose substantial externalities on employees, suppliers, and customers, 
and therefore pure profit maximization may be socially suboptimal. 
On the other hand, an excessive focus on stakeholders carries important risks 
(Tirole 2001). Intervention by the government or other stakeholders weakens the 
incentives of the controlling owner/manager and hence lowers internal efficiency. 
These costs are especially high in EMEs, where stakeholders are not well-organized 
and governments are often inefficient and corrupt. For example, if trade unions are 
not functioning well, labor’s interests are protected by other stakeholders, such as 
national or regional governments, which exacerbates the costs, as stakeholders themselves 
suffer from the multi-tasking problem. 
 
Lessons from Corporate Governance Trade-Offs 
 
These trade-offs emphasize the difficulty of “one-size-fits-all” solutions. Still, the 
above analysis offers some simple insights that would ease most of the trade-offs in 
every economy. It is a first-order objective to pursue the protection of property rights 
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of entrepreneurs. Once their rights are protected, they will have weaker incentives to 
capture the political and legal processes and stronger incentives to develop good 
corporate governance. Another important insight concerns the role of commercial 
banks, and more generally creditors, in corporate governance in EMEs. Since stock 
markets are underdeveloped, most companies in these countries rely on bank credit 
and bonds. As a result, the protection of creditors is an important institution needed 
for external finance and corporate growth. We discuss the challenges of promoting 
credit markets in EMEs in the next section. 
Integration into the global financial system (such as access to global financial 
markets and the insurance industry) can help mitigate most of the problems above 
and reduce the costs of second best solutions. For example, foreign listings have been 
an important means for individual firms to break out of weak institutional environments. 
International media can also be helpful. For firms to build reputation, reputational 
intermediaries are critical. Foreign business press appears to play a positive 
role in this respect, at least in some countries. 
 
Key Trade-Offs in Designing Bankruptcy Laws in 
Emerging Market Economies 
 
Our proposed framework has implications for how to think about bankruptcy 
reform, or more broadly reform of debtor-creditor law, in emerging market 
economies. Generally speaking, bankruptcy law deals with conflicts between a debtor 
and its creditors, and with conflicts among creditors. On one hand, bankruptcy law 
should provide a mechanism to discharge or wipe out all the debts of a failing business 
and thereby to provide insurance to entrepreneurs against large losses that may be 
produced by factors beyond their control. On the other hand, for a creditor to lend 
money to the entrepreneur in the first place, debtor-creditor law must protect her rights. 
When firms have multiple creditors, bankruptcy law makes sure that failing firms 
are liquidated efficiently, that debtors have an incentive to repay creditors when they 
are solvent, that bankrupt firms are restructured in an orderly manner, that assets of 
bankrupt firms are not disposed of in a fraudulent way, that seniority of claims 
among creditors is enforced, and that asset substitution and diversion of assets by 
management or a subset of creditors is prevented. 
Based on how creditor rights are allocated, we can identify at least four key dimensions 
distinguishing existing bankruptcy systems from one another: the degree of 
friendliness toward debtors (or creditors); the orientation toward liquidation or 
reorganization 
of firms; the bias among creditors (such as secured versus unsecured creditors, 
or banks versus bondholders); and the extent of court involvement. Bankruptcy 
systems around the world vary a great deal in how they allocate creditor rights. Even 
developed market economies differ considerably in bankruptcy design. In the United 
Kingdom, the law is viewed as creditor-friendly, with a strong bias toward liquidation 
and conflict resolution delegated to a key creditor. In contrast, the U.S. system is 
considered debtor-friendly, with strong incentives against banks getting deeply involved 
in restructuring firms, and with the courts given a major role in bankruptcy. As for 
corporate governance, it is hard to claim that there is a “one-size-fits-all” system. 
As for other property rights, a number of factors influence how a particular legal 
text eventually is implemented. Bankruptcy procedures, particularly in less developed 
economies, are susceptible to capture by specific interests, sometimes combining 
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tools provided them by bankruptcy law, wealth of resources, and political clout 
as large investors or employers. Actors in the economy learn how to use the system; 
those who use it more often and those with more resources are likely to learn the 
most. If large private creditor institutions exist, they are more likely to be in 
repeated proceedings, implying that there would be an inherent tendency toward 
more creditor-orientation in the implementation of laws. For example, some 
observers of the U.S. bankruptcy system argue that it is much less debtor-friendly in 
practice because of the extensive learning of large creditors, whereas in the United 
Kingdom, informal practices have developed—the so-called London Process—to 
introduce more debtor-friendly features. 
In the discussion that follows, we discuss the most important policy trade-offs 
that a designer of bankruptcy policy faces in any emerging market economy. We 
also describe existing evidence on the resolutions of these trade-offs, when such 
evidence exists. 
 
Ex Post versus Ex Ante Efficiency 
The most fundamental trade-off in debtor-creditor law is that between ensuring creditors 
sufficient protection to extend credit and allowing the entrepreneur a fresh start 
in case of default when the cause is beyond the his control. The latter function is a 
key driver of entrepreneurship. Most entrepreneurs would probably not take the risk 
of founding a new business if they faced unlimited liability. All advanced market 
economies (with few exceptions) have entirely eliminated debtors’ prisons and other 
criminal penalties for default (unless the debtor was found to have fraudulently 
expropriated creditors). The main driving force behind the trend toward decriminalizing 
default has been that the benefits of fostering entrepreneurship outweigh the 
cost of reduced incentives to repay one’s debts. The possibility of relief is particularly 
important in emerging market economies, where volatility is high and social insurance 
systems are poor. 
However, an important lesson from the recent literature is that poor borrowers are 
hurt by excessively lenient enforcement of debt contracts. Although weak enforcement 
obviously helps a financially strapped borrower ex post, it also raises the cost of 
borrowing ex ante and results in the exclusion of poor borrowers from credit markets. 
On the rare occasions when bankruptcy reform is discussed in public debates, one 
observes a general misperception in the public at large that if the preservation of 
employment at all costs is not viable, then at least the pursuit of ex post efficiency is 
desirable. These policy debates miss the fundamental point that there is a trade-off 
between ex ante and ex post efficiency: greater creditor protection ex post often works 
to the advantage of debtors ex ante. Thus a very strong case could be made for creditor 
control of bankruptcy procedures on ex ante efficiency grounds. The contrast in 
India is particularly revealing between the rapid growth in automobile loans and 
mortgages following the passage of the SARFAESI act in 2001, which culminated the 
legal reforms started in 1993 with the establishment of debt recovery tribunals (see 
Visaria 2006), and the previous anemic markets for those loans. 
A noteworthy feature of the EME environment is the coexistence of a modern, primarily 
urban manufacturing sector and a much less developed, often rural agricultural 
sector based on small and medium-size enterprises. Naturally, firms in these two sectors 
are financed in very different ways. This has implications for what kind of bankruptcy 
law best corresponds to the needs of firms and investors. This dual nature of 
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the economies raises the issue of the pro’s and con’s of having separate chapters 
corresponding 
to the different needs of the two sectors. Since entrepreneurship and small 
business growth are particularly important in developing countries, the benefits of 
“fresh start” policies that allow debtor-entrepreneurs to obtain relief from debt 
despite less-than-full creditor repayment (leaving some funds to the entrepreneur) 
arguably are greater than in developed economies. Thus it might be beneficial to have 
special “soft” bankruptcies for small firms and individual entrepreneurs. (It is worth 
noting that for the large firms, the benefits of fresh start are negligible.) There are, 
however, important arguments against such a solution (Ayotte 2007). First, if small 
firms are treated preferentially ex post, incentives to expand business and grow may 
be undermined (as often is the case in Brazil and India). Second, if the bankruptcy 
code is too soft on small firms ex post, it should be difficult for them to get finance 
ex ante, which may hurt their possibilities of growing.3 
The “ex ante versus ex post efficiency” trade-off is behind most of the specific 
policy choices in the design of bankruptcy law. We discuss the most important 
aspects of this trade-off in the next few subsections. 
 
Reorganization versus Liquidation 
A related consideration in designing bankruptcy law is how to strike the right balance 
between reorganization and liquidation. On the one hand in emerging market 
economies, labor markets tend to function less well and social safety nets are less 
developed, suggesting that the social costs of liquidation of firms are higher. Broader 
structural changes in industry are also likely to take place across different industries 
rather than within industries, implying larger costs of adjusting (Shleifer and Vishny 
1992). On the other hand, those EMEs that are growing rapidly can more easily 
absorb human capital made redundant. But even less fortunate developing countries 
often have no means apart from liquidation to transfer assets from the inefficient to 
more efficient uses. Because both their capital markets and their markets for corporate 
control are dysfunctional and their economies highly politicized, they must release 
workers to other parts of the economy. This is particularly important in transition 
economies with strong insider control. In these economies, liquidations should be 
particularly harshly enforced for the old (formerly) state-owned firms; yet these firms 
are usually the ones that get bailed out. 
On balance, bankruptcy law in emerging market economies should probably have 
a liquidation bias—except for the largest firms—because reorganization procedures 
are much more complex than liquidation procedures. To be effective, reorganizations 
necessarily require a more effective judiciary and more competent bankruptcy 
practitioners. 
Overall losses associated with reorganization procedures on average are 
likely to be larger than those of liquidation procedures. Cross-country evidence supports 
this claim. The Doing Business 2005 report (World Bank-IFC 2005) shows that 
the most efficient bankruptcy laws in developing and transition countries prescribe 
simple, fast, and cheap liquidation procedures. 
One cannot argue a priori, however, that liquidation procedures are less susceptible 
                                                 
3 Ironically in many countries, large firms and not small ones have softer bankruptcy de 
facto because of their greater clout in negotiations for government bailouts and “social” 
clauses in the legislation. 
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to capture than reorganizations. Thus the distributional consequences of the 
choice between reorganization and liquidation bias depend on the distribution of 
political power and wealth among the conflicting parties. For example, asset diversion 
may make liquidations extremely debtor-friendly. Thus a close monitoring 
of all transactions in bankruptcies by the interested parties in the conflict should 
be allowed. 
 
Dealing with Systemic Crises versus Ex Ante Incentives 
Much of the evidence and economic analysis on the bankruptcy process in EMEs in 
normal times clearly points in the direction of the benefits of simplified debt resolution 
procedures controlled by creditors. Unfortunately, in the event of a macroeconomic 
crisis, the macroeconomic environment and especially the greater exposure 
of EMEs to systemic shocks also clearly points in the direction of introducing exceptions 
in the implementation of these simple rules. 
In light of the fact that shocks in institutionally less developed economies tend to 
be strongly correlated across firms, several proposals have been floated to allow for 
economy-wide stays on the liquidation of assets of distressed firms in the event of a 
major crisis, such as the Asian crisis of 1997 and the Russian crisis of 1998. If firm 
performance and asset values are temporarily reduced because of a macro shock, it 
makes little sense to plunge the economy into an even worse economic state by closing 
down otherwise healthy firms on a massive scale. Instead, much of the temporarily 
distressed 
value of these firms can be rescued through a coordinated macroeconomic 
response that lets these firms ride through the worst of the storm and increases the 
aggregate demand for their products. 
While such “Super Chapter 11” arrangements (see Miller and Stiglitz 1999) are 
clearly attractive alternatives ex post when many firms simultaneously are facing 
bankruptcy, it is less well understood that the ex ante effects of such an option are 
likely to be adverse, particularly in weak institutional environments. Such procedures— 
allowing for partial debt cancellations, moratoria, or bailouts during major economic 
downturns—are very vulnerable to capture by special interests, thus exacerbating 
credit rationing. However, when the integrity of the political process is sufficiently 
strong, efficiency can be improved not only ex post but also ex ante, as has been 
shown by Bolton and Rosenthal (2001, 2002). 
Another important caveat to the implementation of simple creditor-controlled 
bankruptcy procedures with a liquidation bias in EMEs has been vividly demonstrated 
by the recent bankruptcy reform experience of Hungary. If, like Hungary in 
1990, a country undertakes a drastic bankruptcy reform and immediately tightens 
previously soft budget constraints, the numbers of insolvent firms should be 
expected to increase because of the backlog of bad loans and tax arrears. This wave 
of new insolvencies can overwhelm bankruptcy courts in the short run, as it did in 
Hungary, and give rise to a serious political backlash. The hasty implementation of 
the “automatic bankruptcy trigger” was the reason for the country’s credit crunch 
in the early 1990s and contributed to discrediting the reforms (Mitchell 1998; Bonin 
and Schaffer 2002). 
 
Judicial Discretion versus “Automatic” Liquidations 
An important dimension in designing bankruptcy laws is how much discretionary 
power to give to courts. One rationale for giving discretionary power to the judge is 
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to prevent socially inefficient liquidations that could result if some parties who have 
a stake in the firm, such as employees, local communities, and tax authorities, do not 
have a voice in the decisions affecting the future of the firm after default. Thus, for 
example, the stated goal of French and Indian bankruptcy laws is to preserve employment. 
This is an important reason why these laws have been designed to concentrate 
most powers in the hands of the bankruptcy judge and to leave much less room for 
negotiations between the debtor and the creditors than under, say, U.K. or U.S. bankruptcy 
law. As is widely recognized, however, bankruptcy judges generally do not 
have the expertise to turn around businesses in financial distress and are not well 
equipped (or motivated) to make important and complex business decisions to 
reshape a viable future for the failed firms in a timely fashion. More often than not, 
the reality of court-supervised management of bankrupt firms in France and India is 
a gradual and systematic destruction of the remaining value in the bankrupt firm. 
The effect of discretionary power of courts on financial costs of bankruptcy differs 
significantly between high-income and low-income countries. Higher discretionary 
power of courts appears to be positively correlated with the financial costs of bankruptcy 
across poor and middle-income countries and (slightly) negatively across rich 
counties (see Doing Business 2005 and figure 1). 
 
Specialized versus General Courts 
Bankruptcy reform has often focused on the need for a separate, specialized bankruptcy 
court system, or whether bankruptcies are best handled in regular courts. 
Prima facie, it is difficult to say whether specialized courts are more or less vulnerable 
to capture and corruption (which should be the overriding considerations in thinking 
of designing bankruptcy court system). Cross-country evidence, however, suggests 
that some kind of specialization in expertise of judges and bankruptcy practitioners 
does pay off. Presence of a specialized bankruptcy court (in middle-income countries) 
or a specialized commercial section in the general court (in low-income countries) are 
associated with faster and cheaper procedures and, therefore, better recovery rates. 
Requirements that judges and bankruptcy practitioners are trained specifically in 
bankruptcy law and practice and that they have some prior business experience also 
leads to better outcomes (World Bank-IFC 2005). 
 
Lessons from Trade-Offs in Bankruptcy 
There are a few uncontroversial policy prescriptions suited to the vast majority of 
EMEs seeking to improve their credit markets: allow an independent institution to 
create and manage a data bank with detailed information on assets and financial 
histories of firms; introduce international accounting standards to foster transparency; 
and focus on simplicity and speed in distress resolutions to minimize administrative 
involvement to the extent possible. Most of the existing evidence and modern 
economic theory suggest that in the periods between economic crises, creditorcontrolled 
bankruptcies and simple liquidation procedures for all but the largest 
distressed firms serve the purposes of financial development better than more 
complex debtor-in-possession reorganizations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Lowering the cost of capital for firms in emerging market economies is one of the 
major tasks of economic development. The key arguments we make are as follows. 
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First, in designing policies to attract capital, emerging market economies should 
look at the entire scope of corporate finance, including corporate governance and 
bankruptcy. Focusing just on minority shareholder rights, as is often argued in the 
policy debate, is misleading. Protecting entrepreneurs and large shareholders and 
creditors against expropriation is often a matter of primary importance. Ultimately 
stronger property rights will also benefit minority investors. The role of debt should 
not be ignored; commercial banks can play an important part in corporate governance. 
In more developed emerging markets, private equity funds also complement 
banks in monitoring and restructuring of corporations. In general, corporate governance 
reform and bankruptcy reform are highly complementary. 
Second, optimal corporate governance and bankruptcy reforms in emerging 
market economies are unlikely to resemble those in OECD countries. Ownership and 
capital structures are different, as are the nature and the depth of markets. Government 
failures are also more prevalent in emerging market economies than in developed 
countries. Hence reforms require different priorities and different strategies for 
implementation. 
In particular, many EMEs have already adopted appropriate company and 
bankruptcy laws, but because of imperfect enforcement these changes have not yet had 
the desired effects on the cost of capital. In some circumstances, the transplantation of 
OECD laws that are not enforced or improperly enforced can be directly detrimental 
to financial development. 
Third, there is substantial variation between emerging market economies, which 
implies that there is no “one-size-fits-all” solution. Implementation of reforms will 
depend crucially on the distribution of political and economic power in each particular 
country, as well as its cultural and social environment. Thus instead of suggesting ready 
solutions, this paper identifies the most important conceptual trade-offs in the areas of 
corporate governance and bankruptcy that can help inform policy debate about the 
costs and benefits of specific policy choices. The importance of these costs and benefits 
for each particular country would depend on its economic and political environment. 
Fourth, corporate governance, bankruptcy, judicial, and political reforms are 
highly complementary in emerging market countries. One of the main obstacles to 
financial development—poor enforcement of law and contracts—is closely tied to 
weaknesses in political institutions. Improving enforcement requires policy intervention 
at many different levels, including deep political transformation with 
fundamental constitutional change, and administrative and regulatory reforms. 
Since the level of enforcement is necessarily an outcome of the political economic 
game between interest groups, improving enforcement is an immensely difficult 
task. Under poor contractual and law enforcement, private mechanisms of investor 
protection can help supplement private contracting and public law enforcement. 
However, private enforcement also relies on the quality of courts and public 
enforcement institutions. Ultimately, there is no short-cut to broad institutional 
development, and the design of policies to support corporate finance in a particular 
emerging market economy requires a deep understanding of the institutional context 
of that country. 
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Figure 1. Judicial discretion and the overall administrative cost of bankruptcy. 
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Notes: Difference in the slope of the regression lines in the two samples is robust and 
always statistically significant. 
(i) Source: Doing Business 2005. (Authors’ replication of the results using Doing Business 
data from http://www.doingbusiness.org). 
(ii) Graphs show residual correlation after controlling for per capita income, legal creditor 
rights, legal origin, level of the rule of law and the level judicial efficiency.  
(iii) The effect in poor countries is robust in the direction and magnitude and for a wide 
number of specifications significant. 
(iv) The effect in rich countries is sensitive to the presence of Norway and the 
Netherlands.
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Figure 2. Legal creditor rights and efficiency of bankruptcy procedures in poor and 
middle income countries.  
The provision for secured creditors to 
be paid first in liquidation procedures 
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Notes: The figure shows the only two legal creditor rights which matter for efficiency of 
bankruptcy procedures across countries in the subsample of poor and middle income 
countries are the provision for secured creditors to be paid first in liquidation procedures 
(left plot) and the provision of no automatic stay on assets (right plot). 
(i) Sources: Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer 2004 and Doing Business 2005. (Authors’ 
replication of the results using Doing Business data from http://www.doingbusiness.org) 
(ii) Graphs show residual correlation after controlling for per capita income, legal creditor 
rights, legal origin, level of the rule of law and the level judicial efficiency.  
(iii) In the graph for time vs. secured creditor’s position in priority rule, there are two 
outliers: Mexico (with secured creditors after employees and government and fast 
bankruptcy resolution) and India (with secured creditors first in the queue and long 
bankruptcy). Even though, they are omitted, the relationship is statistically significant 
even when they are included. The relationship also does not depend on inclusion of Brazil.
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Table 1. Time needed to go through insolvency and the cost of the procedure 
15 countries with the slowest 
bankruptcy, 2004 
 15 countries with the most costly 
bankruptcy, 2004 
 Time 
(Years) 
  Cost 
(% of 
estate) 
Marshall Islands 5.3  Fiji 38 
Vietnam 5.5  Panama 38 
Chile 5.6  Sierra Leone 38 
Philippines 5.6  Congo, Rep. 38 
Haiti 5.7  Macedonia, FYR 38 
Belarus 5.8  Venezuela 38 
Indonesia 6  United Arab Emirates 38 
Palau 6.5  Marshall Islands 38 
Maldives 6.7  Philippines 38 
Oman 7  Palau 38 
Mauritania 8  Micronesia, Fed. Sts 38 
Czech Republic 9.2  Haiti 38 
Brazil 10  Central African Republic 76 
India 10  Lao PDR 76 
Chad 10  Chad 76 
Notes: 
(i) Source: DB-2005, http://www.doingbusiness.org  
(ii) Total of 21 countries have cost of bankruptcy equal to 38% of estate. Among these 
countries, the table reports the ones that also have the lowest recovery rates. The actual 
differences in recovery rates as a result of reorganization procedures between rich and 
poor countries are large: on average recovery rates are 67 cents on the dollar in rich 
countries; 34 cents in middle income; and 21 cent in poor (DB 2005). 
 
